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I N T R O DUCTION
The purpose of this case study is to illustrate the use 
of nontraditional solutions as a means to overcome difficult 
problems. Since the bulk of the paper describes the unusual 
approach used in the particular case, it is necessary to provide 
a definition of the nontraditional method at the beginning. 
Perhaps the best way to do this is to provide a brief 
description of what is involved with a traditional waste water 
treatment system.
Most treatment systems are created using a combination 
of EPA grant money and state/local government matching funds. 
This money is applied to create physical plants which give 
sewage two to three stages of treatment depending upon the 
quality of water to which the sewage will be emptied. Primary 
sewage treatment mechanically screens effluent before it is 
allowed to enter settling ponds where the heavier solids are 
removed. Secondary treatment uses aeration or some other 
process to stimulate the growth of bacteria which breaks down 
sewage. These two stages are effective in removing 85-90 
percent of oxygen-demanding waste and 90 percent of all 
suspended solids. The resulting effluent still contains high 
concentrations of phosphates and nitrates. In order to prevent 
these nutrients from harming pristine aquatic environments, it
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
must either be kept from entering surface water, ususally 
through ground infiltration, or given tertiary chemical or 
physical treatment at the sewage treatment plant.^
The circumstances surrounding the creation of Anaconda's 
treatment system ruled out a completely traditional system. The 
combination of physical and financial anomalies specific to the 
situation forced government officials to deviate from the normal 
process. Instead of using engineering and financing techniques 
which had been created for general application, the planners 
involved drew upon resources available to them in order to 
create a project which was unique to the local situation. The 
consideration and application of whatever the particular 
situation offers in an attempt to create a better solution, one 
geared more toward a particular circumstance, is what is meant 
by nontraditional problem-solving technique. In this case 
study, the situation demanded some ceative applications of 
financing and engineering in order to salvage a traditional 
construction plan. The result is a system unique to the 
situation but one that offers additional benefits not foreseen 
in traditional design.
The problems related to construction of a wastewater 
treatment plant in Anaconda are illustrative of how changes in 
federal policy and the local economy can effect the relationship 
between federal and local government. For communities like 
Anaconda, the combination of an overall decrease in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
federal funding and d e clining tax revenues make it d i fficult  
to undertake e x p ensive c o n s t r u c t i o n  projects. In areas where 
federal funding is available, local gove r n m e n t s  are obliged to 
submit grant applications. While federal financial aid is 
essential to project completion, it carries with it the 
increased burden of complicated federal regulation. In the 
cons t r u c t i o n  of Anaconda's wastewater treatment system, it was 
federal regulation which posed the greatest threat to project 
completion. Faced with these difficulties, the city of 
Anaconda and the state of Montana were still able to develop 
an a l ter native approach which could a l low all the agencies 
concerned to meet their a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  goals. To do this, the 
local and state o f f icials had to resort to a n o n t r aditional 
solution to the problem of sewage disposal.
By utilizing a n o n t r aditional a p p r o a c h  to sewage 
disposal, the city of Anaconda was able to create a proposal 
for a system which met E P A 's regulatory requirements. The 
uniqueness of the system allowed Anaconda to integrate its 
sewage disposal plan with the goals of several non-related 
state and federal agencies. E x panding the policy area to 
include these agenc i e s  deferred a good deal of the total 
project cost to them.
The Anaconda wastewater treatment project offers an 
example of how innovative policy can overcome the fiscal and 
technical problems created by recent trends in i n t e r g o v e r n ­
m ental relations. I do not wish to suggest, however, that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
some u n iversally applicable policy process has been found.
Nor is it my contention that all parties con c e r n e d  are 
completely satisfied with the final sewage treatment plan.
The policy created offers an example of a type of p r o c e s s —  
incremental problem solving using some thoughtful and creative 
techniques. By searching for s o lutions in areas not 
traditionally considered, the county and state were able to 
find an answer which satisfies their major concerns and is 
also envi r o n m e n t a l l y  tolerable. As the case study shall show, 
this is no small a c hievement given the circumstances.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
End Notes
^G. Tyler Miller, Jr. E n vironmental S c i e n c e s . An 
I ntroduction (Belmont, C A : W a d s w o r t h  P u b l ishing Co., 1986),
p. 324.
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SECTION I 
Project History 
The city of Anaconda had not dealt seriously with the 
problem of sewage disposal prior to 1981. In fact, no system 
was present at all for the first century of the city's 
existence. The Anaconda Company operated a large smelter at 
Anaconda. One by-product of the smelting process was large 
quantities of polluted water. This water was treated in a 
series of industrial settling ponds created in the upper end of 
the Deer Lodge Valley near the town of Opportunity. The city 
had arranged to channel its sewage via an open ditch into the 
Anaconda Minerals Company (AMC) settling ponds. The volume of 
sewage was not significant compared to the smelter's discharge. 
The company treated Anaconda's sewage along with its own waste 
at no charge to the city.
The availability of free disposal made a sewage 
treatment plant a low priority on the county’s capital 
improvements listing. The engineering firm of Thomas, Dean, and 
Hoskins of Great Falls contracted to produce a facility plan in 
1975. The report concluded that the most feasible alternative 
involved construction of an aeration lagoon with final discharge 
into Warm Springs Creek.^ State and federal EPA officials 
disapproved of the release of treated sewage into Warm Springs 
Creek. Thomas, Dean, and Hoskins produced a followup plan which
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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indicated that allowing the sewage to continue to discharge into 
the Anaconda Company ponds provided the most economical 
alternative.^ The Company and the State approved the plan.
In the fall of 1980, the Anaconda Company closed its 
smelter at Anaconda. With the closure of the plant, the 
Opportunity tailings no longer were needed by the company. The 
removal of the primary source of effluent from the ponds made 
the discharge of Anaconda's sewage a potential liability which 
the company was reluctant to maintain. On January 12, 1981, the 
company informed Anaconda that it would allow continued use of 
its ponds on an interim basis only while the city arranged for 
construction of a new treatment facility.
On June 7, the Anaconda Planning Board met to discuss 
the implications of the January 12 letter from the Anaconda 
Company. The board agreed that Thomas, Dean, and Hoskins should 
draw up a plan for a new treatment facility. The Anaconda 
Company expressed a willingness to supply 190 acres of 
Opportunity pond A for temporary disposal of waste if a formal 
lease document was created.
The plan produced by Thomas, Dean, and Hoskins involved 
discharging treated sewage into infiltration ponds (IP) where it 
would be absorbed into the soil. The sewage would be initially 
treated in two aeration cells before discharge into five 
infiltration ponds. Since the infiltration process does not 
work well in cold weather, five storage ponds would be 
constructed to store the waste through the winter months.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Both the aeration lagoons and storage ponds were to be lined 
with an impermeable liner material. The entire project cost 
about 3.8 million dollars.
The 3.8 million dollar price tag associated with the 
project necessitated a search for financial assistance by the 
county. The tax base for A n a conda-Deer Lodge had steadily 
declined since before the 1980 smelter shutdown. Taxable 
valuation shrunk from $21 million in F/Y 1975-76 to $18.5 
million in 1982.^ Projections promised similar declines for 
the foreseeable future. Faced with dec l i n i n g  revenues, the 
county found it difficult to continue regular services and 
impossible to fund a $3.8 million project without c o n s i d e r a b l e  
aid .
In December of 1982, a formal lease a g reement developed  
between the Anaconda Company and Deer Lodge County which 
allowed use of the O p p ortunity ponds for a m a x i m u m  period of 
three years. The company had set that time frame for project 
completion forcing the county to begin the process of finding 
outside funding so that c o n s t r u c t i o n  could begin.
The logical place for any local government to seek 
financial aid in the area of water quality is the federal 
government. Washington has been in the business of giving 
cash a s s i stance to local sewage treatment projects since 1948. 
The federal presence gradually expanded to include the many 
r e g u l a t i o n s  included in the Clean Water Act of 1972. One 
central strategy of the CWA has remained the upg r a d i n g  of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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m u nicipal wastewater treatment plants w h ich include s e condary 
t r e a t m e n t .
More than 30 billion has been d i sbursed under a 
program in which the federal government funded up to 75 
percent of the eligible costs of a waste treatment project, 
and the local community, usually with state assistance, 
paid the rest. Funds have been a p p ortioned to states 
according to a c o ngressional formula, with each state 
setting its own project c o n s t r u c t i o n  priorities.
On January 27, 1983, the city prepared its a p p l i c a t i o n  
for an EPA grant under the CWA. As proposed, the grant would 
cover about $2.9 million of the total project cost of $3.8 
million. This left a balance of $809,600 whi c h  had to be 
covered by Anaconda as a matc h i n g  share.^ The county 
commission approved the a p p l i c a t i o n  at its February 10 
m e e t i n g ,
In partial fulfillment of its $800,000 obligation, the 
city made an a p plication for $400,000 in C o m m u n i t y  Devel o p m e n t  
Block Grant funding. The federal government gives each state 
the right to dispense cash provided by HUD under the CDEG 
program. Four hundred thousand dollars was the m a ximum 
allowable single award in 1983 as a portion of $4.9 million 
made a v a ilable to the state. Under the regul a t i o n s  set down 
for CDBG grants. Anaconda received the m a x i m u m  amount.
The $400,000 CDBG grant left approximately the same 
amount lacking from the local match requirement. Anaconda 
solved this problem by convincing the Anaconda Company to 
provide a donation of used pipe for the outfall line to the 
aera t i o n  lagoons and the c o n s t r u c t i o n  site for the entire
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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facility. The value of the land ($135,000 for 135 acres at 
$1,000 per acre) plus 4,700 feet of pipe provided the a d d i ­
tional cash value necessary to satisfy the required local 
match. The combined federal, state, and Anaconda Company 
grants would cover the entire cost of the project, allowing 
the county to avoid any significant increase in expense to the 
local taxpayers.
The most crucial aspect of the entire project was the 
approval of Anaconda's request for EPA assistance. When the 
city's grant was received by the state, it was assigned the 
number two position among the proposed projects for the year. 
This ranking assured that c o n s t ruction could begin immediately 
upon approval of the project by the EPA.
The EPA c o n d itions for grant approval included, as with 
any major project under the National Environmental Policy Act, 
that the possibility of the need for an environmental impact 
statement be explored. On June 18, 1983, the EPA issued a 
finding of no significant impact with regard to the Anaconda  
project proposal. This decision meant that EPA did not f o r e ­
see any significant environmental problems relating to plant 
construction. The finding of no significant impact also 
e liminates the need for the compi l a t i o n  of a more detailed 
environmental impact statement.
With a finding of no significant impact, the grant 
process went forward smoothly. On August 31, 1983,
C i t y - C o u n t y  Manager Worsdell received a letter from EPA's
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Region VIII office in Denver a p p r o v i n g  the CWA grant in the 
amount of $3,335,088. The increased award was due to the fact 
that the infiltration pond bed system had qualified as an 
innovative land use method, en t i t l i n g  the county to 85 percent 
federal funding as opposed to the typical 75 percent match. 
Increased engineering costs would n e c essitate several grant 
amendment requests in the rem a i n i n g  months of 1983, but the 
project was on schedule for beginning c o n s t r u c t i o n  in the 
spring of 1984.
In early 1984 c o n s t r u c t i o n  began on the waste water 
treatment facility. C o n s t r u c t i o n  co n t r a c t s  were granted and 
right of way obtained for the new outfall line stretching from 
the existing sewer lines to the new facility. As a result of 
the preliminary planning, it was discovered that a major 
Montana Power Company gas line crossed the area where the 
rapid i n f i l tration ponds were to be constructed. The location 
of the line made it necessary to reroute the section which  
crossed the c o n s t r u c t i o n  site. On October 25, 1984, Montana 
Power Company crews discovered a substantial amount of smelter 
tailings in the soil. T h ese tailings were a bi-product of the 
original smelting op e r a t i o n  at Anaconda. The EPA immediately 
shut down c o n s t r u c t i o n  pending analy s i s  of the smelter wastes.
A c c o r d i n g  to the MDHES report.
Subsequent chemical analy s i s  showed the tailings to 
have high levels of arsenic posing an immediate hazard to 
the c o n s t r u c t i o n  workers as well as crea t i n g  doubts about 
the viability of the site for use in a land a p p l i c a t i o n  
system. Leaching of arsenic into the ground water, toxic 
effects of the compound on the desired biological org a n i s m s
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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in the land a p p lication system, and the o c c u p ational health 
h azard associated with working with arsenic were potential 
problems to consider.
The Anaconda Company and the Montana Department of 
Health and Environmental Sciences u n dertook a field survey of 
the area in order to identify the nature and extent of the 
arsenic contamination.
Test holes were dug throughout the site to a depth 
below any visual tailings. In c o n j u n c t i o n  with the 
sampling work, efforts were made to contact long-time 
residents and AMC e m p loyees to d e termine how the site was 
used throughout the history of smelter operations in the 
a r e a  ,
Research findings indicated that only the upper soil 
levels had large c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  of arsenic (2,000 ppm) while 
deeper deposits showed little contamination. The smelter 
waste was found to be readily identifiable by its reddish 
color. Although a thin covering of the red material could be 
found throughout the area, the deeper c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  were 
limited to the southern quarter of the project site. Based on 
this data, MDHES decided that the project could be salvaged if 
the smelter tailings were removed from the i n f i l tration bed 
site. A letter rec o m m e n d i n g  a c o n s t r u c t i o n  change order was 
issued by MDHES on October 26. The state requested that all 
major tailings be removed from the area. I n f i l tration ponds 
one and two were to be lowered and the area was to be covered 
with topsoil. Tailings were to be deposited on AMC property 
adjacent to the site.
On October 28, removal of tailings began. Special 
p r e cautio ns had to be taken to control dust and protect
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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workers from arsenic contamination. The commis s i o n  approved 
the change order itself on November 1.
The estimated cost of removing the arsenic totaled 
about $680,000, most of which would be paid by the EPA.^ The 
EPA also suggested that the Anaconda Company may be liable for 
cleanup costs under the Superfund legislation. The county 
incurred increased costs also, since the amount of its 
required 15 percent share increased with total costs.
Cost was not the only problem associated with removing 
the arsenic. The tailings themselves proved very d i f ficult to 
remove because of unexpected hardness and quantity. On 
January 9, the excavators finished removing material, and 
MDHES o f ficials gave the go-ahead for con t i n u a t i o n  of the 
original con s t r u c t i o n  plan. The state was also satisfied with 
the arsenic removal results. EPA was not.
A second branch of the EPA, that responsible for 
a d m i n istr ation of the Superfund, insisted on performing a d d i ­
tional testing throughout the site. Initial testing indicated 
normal soluble arsenic in areas where arsenic had been removed 
but una c c e p t a b l y  high levels in areas where tailings were not 
readily visible. These mixed results convinced EPA that even 
more testing was needed. The agency conducted column leaching 
testing in selected areas throughout the site. The column 
l eaching method "simulated" actual soluable arsenic c o n c e n ­
trations with sewage effluent leaching through a four-foot 
column of soil. The initial results of this testing revealed
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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low levels of arsenic but further testing produced levels as 
high as 1,300 ppb, far e x ceeding the accepted drinking s t a n ­
dard of 50 ppb. The initial low levels were thought to be a 
result of a solid phase interaction with the c a lcium minerals 
present in the s o i l s . T h e  c a l cium held the arsenic in place 
until the increased volume of effluent passing through the 
column leached the c a l c i u m  out. Once the c a lcium was removed, 
the arsenic was free to diss o l v e  into the effluent. Based on 
the test results, EPA determined that loading the ground with 
sewage in the infiltration bed area would a l low large amounts 
of arsenic to release into the groundwater. Such d e gradation 
of groundwater was not acceptable to the EPA, and a shutdown  
of the entire project was ordered. Without the use of the 
i n f i l tration beds, the entire project was in jeopardy of 
c a n c e l l a t i o n .
Lacking the infiltration beds, the sewage system was 
little better than the existing system using the AMC ponds. 
A lthough the effluent could be treated in the aeration 
lagoons, it still had to flow s o mewhere after it left the 
lagoons. The EPA consid e r e d  termination of the entire project 
but deferred based on the already considerable project e x p e n ­
diture. On May 27, 1985, the c o ncerned parties met with 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of the Governor's Office in order to develop a 
plan to salvage the sewer project. Whi l e  several options were 
explored, the parties agreed that the two lined treatment 
cells would be c o nstructed pending a final solution. The cost
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of completing this phase of the project added little to 
existing obligations. The cells would provide initial 
treatment of the city's sewage, creating an effluent much 
cleaner than raw sewage but more polluted than would be 
des i r a b l e  for transfer into any surface water. The treated 
water would continue to be discharged into the AMC O p portunity  
ponds while the final disposal of the effluent was considered.
The lack of any permanent solution for effluent d i s ­
charge was only the beginning of new problems created by 
c a n c e l l a t i o n  of the c o n s t ruction of the infiltration ponds. 
Money had been spent to remove arsenic which would just as 
well have been left in place. During that removal process 
Gilman Excavation had incurred c o n s i d e r a b l e  damage to its 
equipment due to the unusual hardness of the tailings 
material. As a result, Gilman made a request for $42,137.82 
in additi onal compensation. In addition, the county no w  owned 
295,750 square feet of liner material which was intended to be 
used in the storage ponds called for by the original design. 
Since the liner material has a very limited shelf life.
Anaconda began efforts to sell the excess and recover some of 
the loss.
In April, the EPA advisory council set up in Anaconda 
met to discuss the new problems which had developed. One fact 
became c l ear from the beginning. The county now had serious 
financial shortfalls with regard to the sewage treatment 
project. The original plan had allowed Anaconda to avoid any
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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increase in sewer fees since the value of land and pipe 
donated by Anaconda Mining met the EPA matc h i n g  requirement.
Now that the infiltration bed plan was cancelled, the value to 
the land no longer applied to match the con s i d e r a b l e  costs 
already incurred. The city had suddenly taken on an a d d i ­
tional $.5 million in debt.
Half a million dollars was an amount which could not be 
raised by the local government from within. The funding would 
be needed more quickly than Deer Lodge County could provide it 
from increased taxes or user fees. The Anaconda Company 
agreed to extend the period in which the Oppor t u n i t y  ponds 
could be used, but continued con s t r u c t i o n  of the aeration 
lagoons was essential since the company still intended to 
close the ponds completely. Although the federal and state 
governments had approved c o n s t r u c t i o n  of the aeration lagoon, 
the project could not continue without Anaconda's demonstrated  
ability to meet its required share of the total cost. While 
the county, state, and federal autho r i t i e s  debated, local 
contractors were becoming increasingly anxious about being 
paid for work they had already done.
The council discussed several possib i l i t i e s  with regard 
to the half million dollar shortfall. Money could possibly be 
obtained from grant programs, like the legacy fund or the 
water d e v elopment program. User fees would c e r tainly be 
increased no matter what option was chosen.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
As a final order of business, the council outlined possible
solutions to the problem of permanent effluent disposal.
Possible alternatives included:
long term continued use of the AMC ponds, piping the treated 
sewage to a different soil dispersion site never directly 
contaminated by AMC use, piping treated sewage to Silver Bow 
Creek or the AMC Warm Springs ponds, removing more topsoil 
from the original proposed soil dispersion site, or 
developing an agreement with AMC to use the treate^^^sewage 
water for irrigation of its revegetation projects.
Of the proposals listed, only the continued removal of topsoil 
from the original plant site would relieve the city of greatly 
increased financial burdens.
On April 18, 1985, the EPA officially informed MDHES that 
it was giving the go-ahead for completion of the aeration 
lagoons despite Anaocnda's financial difficulties. Efforts were 
being started in the state legislature to find a solution to the 
county's money problems. In the meantime, EPA recommended that 
all costs be minimized pending a resolution of the funding 
problem.
Minimization of cost turned out to be a difficult 
undertaking. Construction of the aeration lagoons in a 
hazardous waste area had intrinsicaly higher costs. Workers had 
to be more careful than usual about raising high amounts of 
dust. Protective clothing including respirators, had to be worn 
by all employees at the site. Increased costs also arose in 
relation to the removal of arsenic at the infiltration pond 
site. During the commission meeting of May 22, Milo Manning, 
Planning Board Director, requested a change order in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the amount of an incerase of $13,000. This money constituted a 
settlement with Gilman Excavating for the unexpected damage 
incurred while removing the tailings from the IP bed area. The 
settlement was reluctantly approved for the amount of $13,000, a 
decrease of $29,000 from the amount originally requested by 
Gilman. The county also discovered that an easement to reroute 
connection lines through Rarus Railroad property had to be 
purchased. This fee was minimal ($150 for 5 years) but is 
indicative of the pattern of increased project costs.
The financial problems of the county and the environmental 
hazards found in the area made a solution to the effluent 
problem unusally difficult. Traditional approaches, both 
financial and technological, had not revealed a solution which 
met the concerns of county officials. In response to this, 
state and county officials began to explore nontraditional areas 
in search of an acceptable alternative.
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SECTION II 
The E n vironmental Perspective  
In early 1985, the G o v e r n o r ’s O f f i c e  suggested that the 
county might be able to combine its treatment project with a 
wetlands proposal being considered by the organization. Ducks 
Unlimited. D.U. had been tentatively c o n s i d e r i n g  c o n s t ruction  
of a wetland near Warm Springs, Montana. One concern when 
c on s t r u c t i n g  a wetland is an adequate source of water.
A naconda could provide the water from the treatment plant 
which had the added attraction of being rich in plant n u t r i ­
ents, a vital part of a viable wetland. The county would 
benefit by avoiding the need for mechanical or chemical 
removal of the phosphate and nitrate nutrients. Rather than 
t hreatening the environmental health of local trout streams, 
the n u trients would be absorbed by various animals and plants 
in the m a rsh environment, p r oducing a final water product with 
greatly reduced levels of dissolved nitrates and phosphates. 
There were several other advant a g e s  to the wetland 
proposal as well. The w e t l a n d s  project had the potential of 
qualifying as an innovative land use method and would entitle 
the county to 85 percent funding by the EPA. In addition, the 
$300,000 av a i l a b l e  from D.U. could possibly be used as a match 
for the county. The project also required a ditch to be built 
from the lagoon site to the wetland. The 29,148 square feet
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of unused storage pond liner provided a perfect material for 
lining the ditch.
While the wetland seemed to offer a ready solution to 
the city's disposal problems, the l o ng-term environmental  
effects of such a project are less apparent. Once in place, 
the wetland project would be expected to purify the city's 
waste indefinitely. If the c o n c e ntrated source of nutrient 
could be immediately detrimental to a f r e e - f l o w i n g  stream, 
what might the lon g - t e r m  effect on a more slowly moving 
wetland system be?
The entire idea of the proposed wetland was presented 
to Vicky Watson, professor of Botany at the University of 
Montana. In an i n t erview on May 6, 1987, Dr. Watson stated 
that the wetland concept created no apparent environmental  
hazards. Dr. Watson felt the wetland was capable of providing 
tertiary treatment of sewage with f a vorable impacts long into 
the future. The specific problem of arsenic c o ntamination 
outlined later in this study presented a serious environmental 
hazard; but assuming the proper removal of con t a m i n a t e d  soil 
and protection of pond sites from external ground water 
contamination. Dr. Watson found the concept of a wetland 
treatment project to be e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y  sound.^
The remaining e n vironmental issue revolves around the 
presence of arsenic contam i n a t i o n  at the wetland site. The 
p resence of the arsenic was not denied by anyone. Th e  extent 
of the threat and the types of precaution n e cessary proved to
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be a key point of contention, however. Since o f f icials could 
not a g ree on the scientific evidence, the question became more 
a matter of i n t e r g o vernmental politics, the subject of the 
next section.
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End Notes
^ Interview with Vicky Watson, University of Montana, 
Missoula, Montana, May 6, 1987.
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SECTION III 
EPA Regulation
The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between federal, state, and local 
officials with regard to the wetland project reveals several 
disturbing aspects of i n t e r g o vernmental relations. The most 
obvious of these features is the dominant role played by EPA 
regulations. At every phase of development, the regulations 
promulgated by the EPA controlled the pace of the project and 
determined the nature of work to be done. Although much of 
the EPA's regulation was beneficial in that it provided g u i d e ­
lines for construction, it also acted at cross purposes to 
overall project goals. The EPA's activi t i e s  also seemed to be 
uncoordinated. The agency issued confl i c t i n g  orders, erasing 
decisions made by state agencies and other branches of the 
EPA. This problem was first illustrated by Superfund's d e c i ­
sion to scrap the IP bed plan after MDHES had ordered topsoil 
removal. It c o n t i n u e d  during the entire history of the 
wetland project.
The lack of overall project vision by EPA was first 
i llustrated by a problem with the temporary waste disposal 
plan. The temporary solution called for disposal of treated 
effluent into the AMC pond system. Th e  effluent would flow 
from the lagoons, underneath Montana Highway 48, and into the 
AMC O p p o r t u n i t y  ponds. The EPA expressed concern about the 
safety of the effluent as it crossed beneath Highway 48. The
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EPA recom m e n d e d  that the city disinfect the treated waste to 
protect against the possible health hazards associated with 
potential ingestion of the water by travelers on Highway 48.^ 
The waste had been passing under Highway 48 in a totally 
untreated state for about 30 years without incident. Adding 
disenfec tant to the water could possibly destroy its potential 
for use in the wetland project since the disinfectant would 
inhibit the growth of microscopic plants and animals. As a 
compromise, the DNRC suggested that signs and r e s t r ictions of 
access along Highway 48 would suffice. In a letter, dated 
July 4, 1985, the county health officer accepted the D N R C 's 
suggestion. The county decided to place warning signs along a 
fence which would separate Highway 48 and the effluent ditch. 
The commission later purchased fencing to enclose the effluent 
ditch on both sides of Highway 48. The c o n s t ruction of the 
fence on several hundred feet of both sides of the ditch 
satisfied EPA's concern about the ditch's potential health 
t h r e a t .^
As the wetland project began to develop, problems arose 
because of a lack of integration between agencies. The EPA 
suspected that elevated levels of arsenic might exist in the 
area proposed for the wetlands site. Although tailings were 
not visibly present as was the case at the infiltration bed 
site, no records of exactly where or how the AMC had disposed 
of waste around Warm Springs and O p portunity existed. There 
also existed the possibility that the soil might be
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con t a m i n a t e d  by dust from the smelter e m i s s i o n s  which c o n ­
tained high levels of arsenic. The unpleasant experience at 
the infi l t r a t i o n  bed site made EPA officials more cautious in 
their efforts.
In order to determine the possibility of an arsenic 
problem, the EPA proposed doing studies similar to those 
conducted at the infiltration bed site. EPA o f f icials also 
indicated that final approval could take as long as two 
years. The increased EPA oversight and possibility of a 
two-year delay created a completely different situation in the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the agencies involved in the project.
The entire project now centered upon the regulations 
which the EPA would decide to apply. Unfortunately, not all 
parties were sure as to exactly what EPA would require. The 
a gencies c o ntacted one another individually, with information 
traded between one source having no g u arantee of universal 
dissemination. The c o nfusion which resulted is evidenced by 
the county's efforts to d e termine just what the EPA's decision 
to test meant to the project as a whole.
City Manager Ben Bifoss requested c l arification of the 
situation from the Governor's Office. The county could not 
proceed until B.U.'s reaction to the proposed delay was known. 
In addition, the Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  had scaled down the 
m a x imum federal grant p a r ticipation to 55 percent. Bifoss 
needed to know the level of funding the EPA would allow for 
the wetland project.
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On August 15, 1985, the An a c o n d a - D e e r  Lodge County 
Environmental Council met to discuss local environmental 
problems, Jim Steiner of the state Water Quality Bureau was 
present to address the que s t i o n s  Mr. Bifoss had raised c o n ­
cerning the wetland project. Mr. Steiner told the council 
that the EPA would contribute the full 85 percent grant 
r egardless of the time S u p erfund would spend on its site 
investigation. The D.U. money proposed for the project could 
be used as a community match toward the r e m aining 15 percent. 
Mr. Steiner also stated that Howard Johnson of the Governor's  
Office had been in touch with Ducks Unlimited with regard to 
the EPA investigation. D.U. informed Mr. Johnson that no 
funds had been obligated for the wetland project and that the 
process for doing so would require about a year. Ducks 
U n l imited was still interested but would not commit funds to 
the project until a clean bill of health was granted by the 
EPA. Since initial EPA studies were progressing s a t i s f a c ­
torily, the wetlands project still offered a viable solution 
to the waste w a ter disposal problem.
On September 4, 1985, City-County Manager Ben Bifoss 
met with Scott Ander s o n  of MDHES to discuss the integration of 
the D.U. project and the sewage treatment facility. The 
meeting con f i r m e d  the comments made by Mr. Steiner the month 
before. On September 5, Mr. Bifoss sent c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  to 
Mike B i s h o p  of the EPA requesting a definite answer as to the 
a c c e p t a b i l i t y  of the w e t l a n d s  proposal. Early EPA approval
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was beneficial to the city's project goals since all parties 
realized that a great deal of delay and red tape might cause 
the Ducks Unl i m i t e d  o r g a n i z a t i o n  to with d r a w  its support of 
the project. D. U. could proceed with much less federal 
i n t e r fere nce if the Anaconda treatment project were not 
involved in the wetland construction. In fact. Ducks 
Unlimited had agreed to proceed separately while keeping the 
i ntegration option open for future discussion. Undue delay 
made it less likely that the option would be exercised.
The EPA had many concerns which seemed to insure 
p roblems for the project integration process. The Anaconda 
Company owned the land which was to be used for the wetlands  
project. The Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks would 
lease the land from the company. EPA wished to ensure that 
the lease a g reement would not release the AMC from any lia­
bility associated with the project site. If the EPA funded 
the wetland, cost effecti v e n e s s  would have to be determined 
using c o m p a r a t i v e  analysis. The entire project's e n v i r o n ­
mental ac cepta b i l i t y  would be subject to Superfund review, 
possibly through a time-consuming remedial investigation/ 
feasibility study.
D uring the S e p tember 19, 1985, Anaconda-Deer Lodge 
County En v i r o n m e n t a l  C o uncil Meeting, Mike Bi s h o p  of the EPA 
reported that no remedial i n v e s t i g a t i o n / f e a s i b i l i t y  study 
would be c o nducted at the D.U. wetl a n d s  site. The Anaconda  
Company would investigate possible environmental hazards, with
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particular a t t e n t i o n  being paid to arsenic levels and their 
potential for ground water contamination. The Anaconda 
Company seemed likely to accept continued liability in the 
project area as well. Since the Anaconda Company had a good 
deal to gain by completing the wetland and getting the city 
sewage out to its O p p o r t u n i t y  ponds, the likelihood of a swift 
c ompletion of the necessary study was enhanced.
The EPA published a s e v e n t e en-point list of problems 
which wou ld have to be a d dressed by the Anaconda Company 
study. The agency's concerns focused around the possibility 
of flue dust and tailings c o n tamination in the area. EPA 
planned to require testing for arsenic at the wetland site 
using the same technique as that used on the IP bed site. The 
EPA was content to accept the findings of the company's study 
as long as the testing was done in this fashion.
The problem experienced by Mr. Bifoss in his attempt to 
gather a complete picture of the project status is i l l u s t r a ­
tive of a lack of any one body with some overall project c o n ­
trol. Alth o u g h  the G o v e rnor's Office attempted to fill this 
role, no agency was obliged to report to Mr. Johnson. No one 
authority had the power to keep track of the individual r e a c ­
tions of the a g e n c i e s  with regard to EPA decisions. Th e  local 
g overnment consta n t l y  waited for requests for information to 
be answ e r e d  by the individual organizations. This generated a 
good deal of c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  between the county and other
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agencies, but was most detrimental in the area of finance, 
discussed in the next section.
The next phase of the project best shows the completely 
dominating role played by EPA regulation. The action of EPA 
indicates a puzzling disregard for the opinions of both state 
and private research as well as a continued lack of project 
vision. The EPA's second self-reversal caused more serious 
damage to the project than any other single decision. Costs 
were raised considerably and time was lost while the EPA 
formulated its final decision. The EPA nearly destroyed the 
project's viability by insisting that it alone had the 
expertise to determine site requirements while contradicting 
the findings of the state and private researchers.
Both testing at the wetlands site and construction of 
the aeration lagoons proceeded smoothly into 1986. Testing on 
the outfall line to the lagoons revealed some leakage, proba­
bly due to the condition of the donated pipe, but the system 
did function adequately. The lagoon system itself became 
fully operational in July, with the treated waste continuing 
to flow into the Anaconda Company ponds.
Testing at the wetland site was also completed in July. 
Both MDHES and Tetra Tech, the firm hired by the Anaconda 
Company, concluded that any arsenic problem at the site could 
be eliminated by several inches of top soil r e m o v a l T h e  
MDHES test results used data developed during the column 
leaching done at the infiltration bed site. By applying the
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data developed at the IP bed site, MDHES off i c i a l s  could 
d etermine the probable leaching rates at the wetland. Tetra 
Tech used a more c o m plicated computer model in determining the 
leaching rate of the arsenic. Both tests reached similar 
conclusions. The two studies indicated that c o n s t ruction 
could begin once the u p p ermost 4-6 inches of topsoil had been 
removed from the site. This removal would eliminate the 
chance of any u n favorable environmental effects.
The EPA was not satisfied with either MDHES or Tetra 
Tech's analysis. The EPA delayed the project while it po n ­
dered conducting column leaching tests at the wetland site.
The EPA's opposition caught both MDHES and Deer Lodge county 
of ficials by surprise. EPA had showed no interest in testing 
until after MDHES and Tetra Tech had completed their work. It 
was EPA which had agreed to allow the Anaconda Company to do 
testing at the site. The column leaching would cause further 
delay which seemed unnecessary to both state and local 
officials. After r e ceiving formal complaints from Deer Lodge 
county and state officials, the EPA agreed to review the Tetra 
Tech study. The county went forward with e n gineering on the 
project on the a s s u m p t i o n  that any EPA testing would have 
favorable results.
On Sep t e m b e r  10, 1986, Scott Anderson of MDHES issued a 
memo informing all interested parties that EPA had decided to 
conduct c olumn leaching tests at the wetland site. The new 
EPA timet able a n t i c i p a t e d  a c o n s t r u c t i o n  start on June 1,
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1987. The EPA testing would be paid for by Superfund rather 
than the c o n s t r u c t i o n  grants program. The county would incur 
no direct additional cost.
The seemingly endless delays frustrated the county and 
the state, but the effect on officials at Ducks Unlimited was 
even more disturbing. Ducks Unlimited is a private o r g a n i ­
zation w h ose goal is the creation of habitat which will ensure 
an abun d a n t  North American duck population. As a private 
organization, their involvement with the federal government is 
usually limited. Many prospective projects existed which 
would involve much less red tape and delay than the Deer Lodge 
wetland. The fact that topsoil would have to be removed from 
the area would raise costs and had dampened D . U . 's enthusiasm. 
The additional delay imposed by the EPA caused D . U . to become 
even more skeptical about its role in the wetlands project.
The EPA testing proceeded on schedule through October 
of 1986. President Reagan's approval of the Superfund l e g i s ­
lation of October 17 guaranteed the funding needed to complete 
the testing would be available. The final report was p u b ­
lished in November. The EPA recommended that 12 to 18 inches 
of topsoil be removed from the site and hot spots found during 
testing were to be comple t e l y  a v o i d e d T h e  removal of 12 to 
18 inches of topsoil had the effect of raising the cost of 
wetland c ons t r u c t i o n  to the point where it would not compare 
f avorably with other possible wastew a t e r  disposal methods.
The original design called for c o n s t r u c t i o n  of dikes using
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m a t e r i a l  taken from the surface of the site. Removal of 12 to 
18 inches of topsoil might require dike material to be brought 
in, further escalating project costs.
The results of EPA testing prompted Howard Johnson of 
the Governor's Office to hold a meeting in Helena regarding 
the wetlands project. The January 7 meeting confirmed that 
the wetland project was not feasible if the cost of removing 
12 to 18 inches of topsoil was included. In addition to this 
setback, D. U. was concerned over use of on-site soil for the 
dikes and the requirement for test wells to monitor arsenic 
levels in the ground water. D.U. indicated, in a letter dated 
January 26, 1987, that they would not be responsible for any 
testing w h ich had to be done after project completion. D.U. 
also insisted on a payback provision which would allow them to 
terminate their involvement in the project while allowing 
partial reimbur s e m e n t  of their investment should some e n v i r o n ­
mental problem arise. The c o mbination of Ducks Unlimited 
reluctance and increased project costs seemed to have 
d estroyed chances of project integration at this point.
Based on the r e q u i r e m e n t s  of the EPA report, county 
o f ficials realized that the major obstacle to the c o n s t ruction 
of the w e t l a n d s  was the cost of removing 12 to 18 inches of 
topsoil. The county off i c i a l s  were not ready to write off the 
wetland project after they had expended so much effort to see 
it to this point. Cou n t y  Manager Ben Bifoss decided to 
approach the Job Corps with a proposal to involve them in the
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soil removal portion of the wetlands project. The Job Corps  
was already involved in a similar project north of the p r o ­
posed wetland site. On December 8, a meeting was held by the 
Job C o rps Advisory Council for the purpose of creating a 1987 
project priority list. When the list was completed, the 
Anac o n d a  wetlands project occupied the number two spot. Job 
Corps participation would allow the county to remove topsoil 
from the area prior to any calculation of project cost. The 
stripping and removal of topsoil prior to cost evaluation 
would put the D.U. project back in the running as EPA began 
the required benefit-cost analysis of all proposed solutions.
The local government was committed to saving Ducks 
U n limited's participation in the wetland project. The 
$ 300,000 which D.U. offered as a contribution made the entire 
project a ffordable for the county. It did not play a role in 
the amount of money which EPA would need to produce. Perhaps 
the EPA lost sight of the importance of D . U . 's participation 
when it began its testing at the D.U. site. Perhaps the EPA 
felt D.U. participation was more definite than it really was. 
What is certain is that by April of 1987 the combination of 
delay, cost increases, potential environmental hazards, and 
the overall complications involved in the project caused Ducks 
Unlimited to anno u n c e  its complete withdrawal from project 
partici p a t i o n  .
The EPA's regulatory demands are not solely r e sponsible  
for D . U . 's withdrawal, but the increased burden they presented
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had to impact D.U. in a negative manner. While local 
a u t h o r i t i e s  were concerned about the effect their decisions 
would have on overall project integration, the EPA seemed to 
treat the issue as peripheral. The loss of D.U. participation 
meant that the county had to find some way to replace the 
$300,000 which D.U. had offered. The wetland qualified for 85 
percent federal funding since the EPA found it to be an i n n o ­
v ative land application. If the project could not be saved, 
the EPA share would probably shrink to 75 percent, since other 
areas suitable for disposal were likely to be contaminated by 
arsenic also. Should all a l t e rnatives prove unacceptable, the 
state law would allow direct disposal of waste into Warm 
Springs Creek. Alth o u g h  this proposal met both state and 
federal requirements, providing no other affordable solution 
was found, and offered a cheap alternative to the county, it 
offended the environ m e n t a l  sensibilities of local officials.
The unac c e p t i b i l i t y  of direct dumping to the creek and the 
probable lack of suitable a r s e n i c - f r e e  areas for disposal 
through i n f i l tration or use as irrigation made local officials 
even more determined to save the wetland proposal.
In April of 1987, the county again approached the Job 
Corps regarding the wetland site. The county proposed that 
the Job Corps might u n dertake the entire wetlands construction 
project. C u r r e n t l y  it seems probable that the Job Corps will 
u n d e r t a k e  the c o n s t r u c t i o n  of the wetlands as part of its 
training program. If this is accomplished, the wetland can be
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developed at no further cost to Anaconda. The wetlands would 
become by far the most cost beneficial solution since 
construction costs would be borne by the Job Corps. The use of 
the wetland would still qualify as an innovative use, entitling 
the county to the 85 percent EPA funding.
The securing of Job Corps participation will allow Anaconda 
to complete a unique wastewater treatment project. The final 
design combines the available resources in such a manner as to 
minimize costs to the taxpayers while creating an 
environmentally acceptable system. The State of Montana and 
Anaconda-Deer Lodge can now look forward to a treatment system 
which meets the needs of the city of Anaconda well into the 
future.
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County, Anaconda, Montana, August 2, 1985.
^Letter to John W a r d e l 1, E n vironmental Protection 
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SECTION IV 
Financial Relations  
The lack of c o o r d i n a t i o n  between agencies had Its 
g reatest effect in fiscal matters. While the absence of some 
means of centr a l i z a t i o n  created problems with regard to EPA 
pronouncements, it nearly destroyed the project monetarily. 
M i s t a k e s  were made because the county never fully understood 
what was expected of it with regard to the Department of 
Natural Resources. The DNRC made mistakes which went 
unnoticed initially because no one knew what should have been 
f orthcoming from the agency. The history of the DNRC loan 
provides the best example of how damaging communication 
failure can be.
While the wetlands project was looking more and more 
like a viable solution, the immediate problem remained raising 
one-half million dollars to continue the c o n s t ruction of the 
a era t i o n  lagoons. The legislature had passed H.B. 947 which 
authorized the M o ntana Department of Natural Resources and 
C ons e r v a t i o n  to loan A n aconda-Deer Lodge "up to $500,000 at an 
interest rate of zero points below that received on the 
l o n g-term bonds issued by the state for the first five years 
and at the bond rate for the r e m aining 15 years"^ of the 
payback period. DNRC would accomp l i s h  this loan by buying 
bonds from the county. A 4 percent o r igination fee would also
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be charged to the county. Loan payback would be accomplished 
through revenue generated by increased sewer use fees.
The county considered the DNRC loan to be its best 
o p t i o n  at the t i m e . On June 26, 1985, the commission passed a 
resolution of intent to accept the loan and issue the bonds.
The county did explore other options, however. The firm of 
Evensen, Dodge, Inc., was consulted, and the DNRC loan was one 
of three possible a l t e r n a t i v e s  considered in their report. At 
an interest rate of 9.5 percent, the DNRC loan was competitive  
with the other alternatives.
On October 11, 1985, the city received some good news 
about the DNRC loan agreement. DNRC informed Mr. Bifoss that 
the interest rate on the loan would be lowered from 9.5 per-
Ocent to 6.375 percent. The difference would mean a reduction 
in debt redemption payments of $10,000 per year ($78,000 to 
$68,000). The new interest rate made the DNRC loan by far the 
superior option a v ailable for funding the treatment project.
The completion of the loan agreement became increasingly  
urgent since c o n t r a c t o r s  working on the lagoons were expecting  
p ayments from the city no later than the first week of 
N o v e m b e r .
In late October of 1985, the contractor informed the 
county that delays caused by non-arrival of equipment would 
e xtend the project completion date into the spring of 1986.
T his delay could well have been a blessing in disguise since 
there was some doubt as to how the lagoons would function if
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the start-up was accomplished in the cold winter months. The 
c o n t r a c t o r s  completed all possible work in anticipation of a 
D ece m b e r  shutdown. The schedule called for resumption of 
c o n s t r u c t i o n  upon arrival of parts and warm weather.
As Anaconda prepared to pay contractors with loan money 
for work done prior to the shutdown, a snag developed with 
regard to the loan itself. On November 1, 1985, Mr. Bifoss 
informed the commis s i o n  of a critical mistake made by the 
city. In his weekly information letter to the commission, 
Bifoss ex plained that.
The DNRC was c o ncerned about the county's ability 
to pay back the loan. Loan payments were to be met from 
revenue generated by the sewer user fee. In May 1984, that 
fee had been set at $2.30 per month. According to the bond 
counsel, a published notice and individual mailed notices 
of the increase was necessary before the ordinance could be 
adopted . ̂
A n a c o n d a  had not issued the required notifications. Since 
there was some question as to the validity of the new rate,
DNRC refused to close the loan.
The mi x - u p  between DNRC and the county developed when 
Mr. Bifoss requested a listing of documen t a t i o n  needed to 
close the DNRC loan. The request was made on September 4,
1985. The DNRC response was not received until over a month 
had passed. During that time period, the county had assured 
cr e d i t o r s  that payment would be forthcoming when the loan was 
closed in November of 1985. T h e  loan d o cumentation r e q u i r e ­
ments did not arrive in time to allow the county to rectify 
the procedural mistake before the closing d a t e D N R C
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of f i c i a l s  were either unaware of the urgency involved or were 
lax in providing the necessary information. In either case, 
the delay created a serious problem for county officials.
The county could argue that the new rate was valid, but 
time would be saved by simply correcting the deficiency.
Speed was important since payments to the contractors were 
already late. The county was in danger of having to pay 
interest on what was owed the contr a c t o r s  if payment fell much 
farther b e h i n d .
The DNRC loan delay allowed the county to reconsider 
its sewer rate. Asking rate payers to ratify a rate which had 
been in place for two years, p a r t i cularly since tax bills had 
just been issued, presented a politically distasteful option. 
The 1984 rate had been set before the county realized a h a l f ­
million dollar debt needed to be retired from the tax 
receipts. The 1984 rate was entended to raise funds s u f f i ­
cient for operating and maint e n a n c e  costs only. The county 
also faced a loss of 85 percent EPA matc h i n g  funds if the D.U. 
project failed to go through. The sum of $106,000 borrowed 
from the operations and m a i n t e n a n c e  fund and financing and 
bond sales costs totaling about $31,500 added to the costs 
incurred since 1984. A total of $137 , 5 0 0  in additional debt 
made the old sewer rate seem inadequate. The Ducks Unlimited 
project offered a possible r e i m b ursemnt of $106,000, but that 
funding was far from g u a r a n t e e d .^
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Considering the need for public notification to validate 
the 1984 rate, and the increased costs incurred since 1984, Mr. 
Bifoss suggested that the county increase the sewer rate 
sufficienty to cover those increased costs. All necessary 
procedures would be followed to satisfy DNRC and complete the 
closure of the loan. Inter-fund loans would be used to allow 
the county to meet its immediate obligations to the contractors 
while avoiding interest payments.
After conversations with DNRC bond counsel member John 
Radonich, Manager Bifoss recommended that the commisssion seek a 
12 percent increase in the sewer fund. The new rate of $2.57 
per month would not cover expenses should the D.U. project fall 
through, but it would offer an acceptable interim solution. The 
conmmission scheduled public hearings on the increase for 
January 8, 1986.
On November 12, the DNRC issued a letter announcing that the 
6.375 percent interest rate quoted in October had been a 
mistake. The new rate of interest would be a 9.29 percent. The 
city chose the DNRC loan because of the 6.375 percent rate. 
Considerable efforts went into securing the loan. The new loan 
rate would cost an additional $9,000 per year which would have 
to come from a 8 percent rise in user fees. Having committed to 
the DNRC loan, the city was in a poor position to explore other 
options. The increased cost had to be absorbed.
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Since no other authority had been involved in the DNRC 
loan project, no one was in a position to question the o r i ­
ginal interest rate. The lower rate appears to be the result 
of a mistake at DNRC. A body with overall project authority 
might have noticed the suspiciously low rate quote before the 
c ounty was locked into the loan. The county's options closed 
when it committed to the DNRC loan. It is impossible to 
d et e r m i n e  what other options may have surfaced had the low 
DNRC quote not destroyed the incentive to look.
The wetlands project involved nontraditional p r o b l e m ­
solving techniques in all aspects of the operation. By i m p l e ­
menting these p r o b l e m -solving techniques, the project avoided 
repeated threats to its completion. It is clear that the 
process did not go smoothly, however. Even nontraditional 
s o lutions were found wanting in some areas. The conclusion of 
this paper is devoted to i d e ntifying the source of some of the 
roadblocks to completion w h ich presented themselves. By 
identifying the source of the problem, it is possible to make 
r e c o m m e ndations for use in future projects.
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SECTION V 
Conclusion
The completion of the Anaconda sewage treatment project 
will in all probablility be a reality soon. The engineering 
and financing took a d vantage of what the local environment 
offered in order to overcome obs t a c l e s  which arose along the 
way. Although the exact conditions which made the wetland 
project possible may never be duplicated exactly, every 
s i tuation offers its own c o mbination of unique possibilities. 
Just as the energy crisis proved the value of conservation, so 
might the new rules of i n t e r g o v ernmental r e lations prove the 
value of n o n t r aditional problem solving.
The use of a l ternative so l u t i o n s  requires the freedom 
of experimentation. Federal regulation can play a negative 
role with regard to this freedom. While the EPA is certainly 
n e cessary in its role as a provider of financial aid, and as 
the source of broad en v i r o n m e n t a l  policy, the complexity of 
regulation and lack of broad policy vision can function to 
make envi ron m e n t a l  protection more difficult. The requirement 
that sewage from the Anaco n d a  plant be disinfected while only 
untreated waste would be suitable for the wetland offers an 
e x a m p l e  of the regulation acting at cross purposes. The 
comple x i t y  of the testing process itself served to discourage 
Ducks Unl imited and confuse state and local officials. The 
overall goal of protecting the e n vironment from arsenic
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contami n a t i o n  is laudable and falls within what is widely 
accepted as the federal government's role. Indeed, the entire 
arsenic problem stems from a lack of such federal regulation 
during the first half of this century. The overall regulatory 
mission is sound, the nature of the enforcement of the goals 
of that mission needs reform. The difference between d e r e g u ­
lation on the one hand and the need for regulatory reform 
h ighlighted by this paper, is a subtle but important one.
The Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  supports the idea of re g u l a ­
tory reform in the area of environmental policy. In the area 
of state/federal relationship, the interest in reform has been 
particularly keen. The administration's program revolves 
around the belief that programs are best handled at the state 
and local level. The increased freedom associated with local 
control is supposed to appease state and local officials 
angered by the loss of federal assistance.^
The attempts at regulatory reform at EPA have been 
largely unsuccessful. The o f ficials at EPA failed to di s t i n ­
guish between d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  with E P A 's maze of a d m i n i s t r a ­
tive requirements and the support of the overall mission of 
the agency. The EPA began the process of change with a 
devotion to the Reagan ideology. This ideology went beyond 
regulatory reform and into the realm of deregulation. As 
opposi t i o n  to d e r e g ulation grew, the ch a n c e  t o create 
meanin g f u l  reform was also lost:^
Some of EPA's basic statutes were excessively 
complicated, others lacked procedures for setting
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priorities, and all needed to be better coordinated to 
e nsure a positive cumulative impact. . . . These problems
required a commitment to good regulation rather than simply 
to deregulation, and it required consensus building among 
the agency's many cons t i t u e n t s  . . .  if they were to be 
solved. The EPA . . . not only failed to tackle these
i ssues effectively, but also seriously poisoned the 
a tmosphere against the cooperation and consensus building 
that would be needed.'^
The m a n i f e s t a t i o n s  of both federal attempt at de r e g u ­
lation and the failure of regulatory reform are apparent in 
the Anaconda project. The arsenic c o ntamination which existed 
at the i n f i l t r a t i o n / s t o r a g e  bed site was visible to the naked 
eye. It is difficult to understand why it was never analysed 
before construction. Perhaps the county was too anxious to 
take advantage of the free land made available by the A M C .
The c o n s t r u c t i o n  grants people at EPA and MDHES apparently 
viewed the project like any other, ignoring its proximity to 
the designated Superfund cleanup site to the south and the 
huge piles of c o n t a m i n a t e d  tailings, called the redsands, to 
the northwest. Both may have relied too heavily on AMC 
pronouncements that the land was suitable for the project.
While these e x p l a n a t i o n s  may help understand the 
failure of local, state, and the c o n s t r u c t i o n  grant officials 
at the EPA, it does not explain the absence of review by the 
Sup e r f u n d  branch. At this time (early 1 9 8 0 's), the EPA did 
very little to identify and restore areas contaminated with 
toxic waste. The EPA was not committed to the program and 
att e m p t e d  d e r e g ulation by failing to enforce existing r e g u ­
lations vigorously. The agency did not try to d i s t i n g u i s h
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between good regulation and no regulation. Instead of 
deciding which aspects of its program of oversight were needed 
and which were burdensome, the EPA delayed the entire process 
of site identification and cleanup.^ It is possible that a 
more vigorous attempt to identify potential problem areas in 
the Anaconda area would have identified the arsenic at the IP 
bed site before the plant construction began.
Changes in upper-level management altered the EPA's 
attitude prior to the beginning of the D.U. wetland project. 
The agency began to enforce the regulations which it issued as 
is evidenced by its wise insistance upon early testing at the 
proposed wetland site. Unfortunately, the newly motivated EPA 
was still burdened with the old, inefficient, and confusing 
regulatory baggage which allowed the agency to issue 
conflicting orders regarding arsenic removal at the IP bed 
site and testing at the wetland.
The example illustrates that the deregulatory path chosen 
by EPA has the potential to be at least as damaging as the bad 
regulation which it was designed to replace. Deregulation is 
much easier to bring about. It requires only the stoppage of 
oversight. Reform is much more difficult and has yet to be 
successfully attempted by the EPA.
The wetland project also suffered from a lack of overall 
coordination. The governor's Office was the only agency 
which seemed aware of more than one agency's activity. Even 
with the Governor's Office involved, the city-county
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manager was often searching for more information. The 
Enviro n m e n t a l  Quality Council met to provide the EPA's s t a n d ­
point, but these meetings were too infrequent judging from the 
number of requests for information from EPA which were issued 
by the City Manager's Office. The city rarely, if ever, 
talked directly to D.U. and couldn't get DNRC to answer its 
r equests in anything resembling a timely manner. Such prob­
lems are likely to occur when no one entity exists which can 
view the project as a whole. This is of particular importance 
consi d e r i n g  the unusual number of actors which can become 
involved when n o n t r aditional solutions are attempted.
The final problem identified by this project involves a 
deficiency in state/local government control. When EPA grant 
money is involved in a project, the agency seems to extend its 
involvement to all phases. While better intra-agency c o o r ­
dination and regulatory reform can curb some of EPA's i n t r u ­
siveness, only increased state and local control can guarantee 
that the ideas of these off i c i a l s  will not fall on deaf ears.
Arguing for greater state and local authority always 
allows for some criticism. T h e r e  exists the real potential 
for corporate corruption at the state and local level. While
recent events at EPA indicate that the federal government is
5also susceptible to cor p o r a t e  influence, it is the dominance  
of the Anaconda Company within Montana w h ich allowed it to 
pollute the environment in the first place. The fact remains 
that state and local a u t horities will usually have a better
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command of the options available locally. It was the state 
and the county which identified the potential for using the 
Job C o rps and D.U., not the EPA. The local government was in 
a position to push for direct discharge into Warm Springs 
Cr eek but choose to continue to struggle for creation of the 
wetland. While discharging to the creek offered an easy 
solution, and was conditionally acceptable to EPA*, the idea 
was not e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y  acceptable to county officials. This 
action speaks well for state and local dedication to e n v i r o n ­
mental quality.
The reform of EPA regulation, greater intra-agency 
coordination, and an increased level of control by state and 
local a u thorities are necessary if n o n t r aditional problem 
solving is to work smoothly. The final section of this paper 
ad dresses some suggestions for bringing about changes which 
will aid the nontr a d i t i o n a l  process.
*The EPA would allow such dumping if it were a matter  
of economic necessity.
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SECTION VI 
Recommendations  
Several areas of reform need to be addressed if any 
lesson is to be drawn from Anaconda's treatment project.
Steps need to be taken if future projects are to avoid the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  e x perienced here. By addressing these problems 
successfully, the use of nontraditional techniques can be 
encouraged and successful solutions made more certain.
The first necessary correction falls more into the 
category of mistake than any of the others previously 
mentioned. The failure to perform on-site investigation at 
the IP/storage pond area created a great deal of extra cost 
and time delay. By simply coming out and inspecting the 
proposed site personally, o f ficials can greatly reduce the 
chance that obvious signs of trouble will be overlooked. 
Perhaps that lesson has already been learned. The EPA did 
require inspection at the wetland site, discovering arsenic 
contamination before c o n s t r u c t i o n  began.
The area of EPA regulatory reform is one which is 
entirely in federal hands. "Under previous administrations, 
EPA had pioneered regulatory reforms such as emissions trading 
and also had led inter-agency efforts toward regulatory 
coordination."^ The EPA abandoned this course when it 
embar k e d  on its deregulatory e n d e a v o r s  in the early 1980's.
The EPA needs to return to the path of regulatory reform. The
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a gency must examine the body of regulation in order to weed 
out those which are c o nflicting or unnecessary. This process 
does not call for abandonment of regulatory goals or de r e g u ­
lation. It is simply an attempt to remove those regulations 
which make protecting the environment unnecessarily difficult.
The lack of communication between agencies presents a 
problem that must be overcome. One possible solution involves 
the creation of a board or committee whose job is the o v e r ­
sight of the entire project. This committee need not have 
more than an advisory function. Composed of a team of 
generalists, a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  from various state, local, and 
federal agencies, the c o m m i t t e e  is in a position to consider 
the big picture. The DNRC loan mixup is the best example of a 
problem generated by a lack of overall control. An oversight 
committee provides a ready source of information on the entire 
project, saving the time consumed by contacting each agency 
individually and assuring that the breakdowns of c o m m u n i c a ­
tion, like that which occurred with DNRC, are avoided. The 
committee provides a forum in whi c h  final decisions can be 
created with input from all the agencies concerned. The 
reactions of one agency to a n o ther's proposal can be gauged 
before de cisions are final, helping to avoid conflicts and 
d ecision reversals which hamper project completion.
Increased state and local government control can also 
lead to a more efficient process. The EPA should not abandon 
its role as regulation provider. Some sta n d a r d s  must be set
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at the federal level and some general requirements are 
necessary. What is not necessary is the complete control 
exhibited by EPA. It is possible for the EPA to allow more 
freedom for the state agencies to decide what methods and 
techniques are necessary to meet federally established 
standards. The states can decide, based on the local situ­
ation, how best to conform to those standards. This will 
require more faith in the state's ability to deliver s c i e n ­
tific e x pertise and in their willingness to protect the 
environment. The behavior of both state and local authorities 
during the history of the Anaconda treatment project indicates 
they are worthy of that faith.
In the area of air pollution control, something 
approaching this technique is already used by EPA. The EPA 
e s t ablishes national ambiant air pollution quality standards.
The states are allowed to choose any pollution mix as long as
2its ultimate effect is compliance with federal standards.
Such freedom to act within the federal guidelines can 
stimulate creative thinking while assuring that national goals 
are not ignored .
The n o n t r aditional appr o a c h  to problem solving adopted 
by Anaconda and the state of Montana allowed a system to be 
developed which meets the environ m e n t a l  s t a ndards of the EPA 
and the budget constraints of the county. The r e c o m m e ndations 
o utlined in this section increase the speed and efficiency of 
the process. Better regulations, not deregulation, on-site
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inspection, greater state control, and intra-agency c o o r ­
d ination are all keys in providing the freedom necessary to 
find solutions to problems in the ratified financial 
atmosp h e r e  of the 1980*s.
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